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Introduction
Jakob De Roover and Sarah Claerhout
The following three articles are results of a common research program 
called the “Comparative Science of Cultures” (originally “Vergelijkende 
Cultuurwetenschap” in Dutch), which was developed by S. N. Balagangadhara 
at Ghent University, Belgium (see Balagangadhara 1994, 2012). Even though the 
articles focus on very different themes — the religious-secular distinction, the 
belief in the cultural universality of religion, and Gandhi’s writings on con-
version and religion — they throw light on several aspects of this research 
program.
One of the basic concerns of the Comparative Science of Cultures is the 
current state of the social sciences and humanities: these appear to describe 
a Western cultural experience. The descriptions that we work with, the terms 
these “sciences” use, and the theories that are built reflect how the West has 
experienced itself and other cultures. This goes both for the Western study of 
non-Western cultures and for social theorizing in general. After all, the study 
of non-Western cultures developed in continuous interaction with the growth 
of the social sciences and humanities. Theorists approached the descriptions 
provided by early writers (such as the Orientalists) as though these were facts 
in need of explanation. For instance, Orientalists provided descriptions of 
“Buddhism,” “Hinduism,” and the social structures of Asian societies; these 
were then taken-up by other thinkers like Max Weber and Karl Marx in order 
to explain why capitalism had not developed in Asia, or by Montesquieu and 
Karl Wittfogel to account for “Oriental despotism.” Subsequently, such theories 
were used to conceptualize Asian cultures and societies further.
Naturally, the particular cultural experience that the West has had of itself 
and others is neither universal nor neutral. Like all experiences, it is a limited 
experience: it is structured and constrained by a background of prior attitudes 
and modes of thinking. As a result, the conceptual apparatus produced by 
today’s social sciences and humanities also operates within specific cultural 
constraints.
An important constraint in this conceptual apparatus is the transforma-
tion of all other cultures into variants of Western culture. Put more accurately, 
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others are reduced to variations of the West’s conception of itself: all cultures 
have their “own” religions; these also consist of sets of metaphysical beliefs; 
their practices are expressions of such beliefs; their ethics revolve around 
norms and values; a set of laws constitute the foundation of societies and polit-
ical authorities, among other things, which sustain such a legal and political 
system. In other words, cultures are not only structured in the same way, but 
they are also different from each other in the same way. While there is variety 
to the content of their beliefs, practices, norms, and laws, what remains invari-
ant is the formal structure of such societies.
The dominant frameworks in the contemporary study of religion and cul-
ture were shaped by the secularization of Christianity. Secularization here does 
not entail that these frameworks freed themselves from their religious moor-
ings, but that they are products of a Christian religion that is reproduced in a 
“de-Christianized” form. That is, Christian religious structures spread across 
Western societies in the form of commonplaces. This is not to suggest that 
there is a one-to-one relationship between theological ideas and their secular 
translations. Rather, recurring patterns or tropes from Christian theologies are 
transformed into the “topoi” of Western culture. These topoi (singular “topos”) 
have a number of properties. They are not isolated ideas but consist of larger 
clusters of related ideas. They also consist of specific kinds of commonplace 
ideas, namely those that become conceptual resources for developing theories 
and hypotheses (De Roover, et al. 2011:578–581). They can be formulated in sev-
eral ways, using different terminology to express the same topos. Such topoi 
constitute the basic building blocks of current theorizing about religion, and 
they also structure the descriptions that Western culture has given of itself and 
other cultures.
This suggestion has several consequences, some of which are examined in 
the following three articles. A first major consequence is that some self-evident 
“facts” in today’s reasoning about religion actually reproduce the Christian-
theological beliefs of yesterday’s debates. Jakob De Roover’s essay examines 
how this is the case for the belief that religion is a cultural universal. For cen-
turies, the potential existence of “nations” or “tribes” without religion consti-
tuted a crucial concern of Christian thinking about humanity, but the debate 
on this issue was eventually settled by transforming a theological assertion 
into an anthropological “fact.”
A second closely related consequence is that central concepts in today’s rea-
soning about religion travel with undeclared theological baggage: their basic 
significance and intelligibility rely on a series of other ideas and beliefs which 
are fundamentally theological in nature. Once detached from these surround-
ing beliefs and ideas, within which they were originally embedded, the relevant 
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ideas encounter unexpected problems. In his contribution, Balagangadhara 
demonstrates how the much-discussed distinction between the “religious” 
and the “secular” faces such problems. Originally, this concerned a theologi-
cal distinction internal to Christianity between the spheres of true religion, 
false religion (or idolatry), and the secular or religiously indifferent. That this 
triad was reduced to the so-called “religious-secular binary” keeps generating 
unsolvable problems in contemporary debates.
Third, if topoi are dependent upon larger frameworks or clusters of com-
monplace ideas (or other topoi), then this entails that they may not travel eas-
ily across certain cultural boundaries. After all, the commonplace ideas of one 
particular culture or society are not shared by all other cultures and societ-
ies. When topoi nevertheless migrate from one culture to another, they will be 
interpreted and understood using clusters of topoi present in that second cul-
ture. In her contribution, Sarah Claerhout shows that this can lead to a pecu-
liar kind of conceptual distortion. Examining Gandhi’s writings on religion 
and conversion, she reveals how his distortive use of certain English-language 
terms and phrases indicates a deeper coherence in his thought, which reflects 
Indian commonplace ideas about traditions and change.
How can the social sciences and humanities move beyond the cultural con-
straints that currently limit their theorizing? This question points to the task of 
“decolonizing” the social sciences and humanities: there is a need for building 
alternative theories in different domains — including the study of religion — 
which should take into account the experience that non-Western cultures have 
of themselves and of the West. But the first step in this alternative theorizing 
is precisely that of showing how current theories and descriptions are con-
strained by a culture-specific conceptual language. It is on this theme that the 
following three articles focus.
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